Introduction
It is fair to call the Husserl-Heidegger relationship the classic topic of phenomenology. It was at the heart of the phenomenological debate even before the publication of Heidegger's ground-breaking Being and Time (1927) common. Others, on the other hand, have argued that they are in fact working on the same philosophical project without being aware of it. Because of its complexity, this has been a long-standing issue, and not only within phenomenology, which has contributed to the way phenomenology as a whole has been received by the philosophical world at large. Lastly, given their difficult personal relationship one should regard Husserl's and Heidegger's views of one another with great scepticism. Indeed, a great deal of misunderstanding, deliberate or otherwise, led to their dispute and to the feud that ultimately ended their friendship.
methodological foundation in developing their respective philosophical 'systems', regardless of where this foundation led them -Husserl, to a full-fledged eidetic science of consciousness, Heidegger, to a new ontology that thematizes the Being of the entities. Also, both had important thematic things to say about human subjectivity itself. However, the difference in the way they understood subjectivity can be seen as the central topic around which their dispute evolved.
Although Husserl considered Heidegger's redrafting of phenomenology as a hermeneutics of facticity fundamentally flawed -derogatorily rendering it 'anthropologism' -the criticisms that
Heidegger levelled against Husserl's concept of the transcendental subject, e.g., in his comments on Husserl's draft of the encyclopedia entry, remained in the back of Husserl's mind and resurfaced in peculiar contexts in his later manuscripts. It is my contention that the curious term 'transcendental person' that Husserl employs in some of these manuscripts, while being consistent with his earlier discussions of personhood (especially in Ideas II), is a direct reply to his pupil's objections. It is this concept on which I would like to focus centrally in this paper, as it both forms a memorable catchy term for Husserl's standpoint and yields an optimal target for Heidegger's critique.
In section 1, I shall sketch both Husserl's and Heidegger's project of a philosophy of human subjectivity. It will become clear that Heidegger's critique of Husserl's 'unparticipating observer', 7 if plausible, has fatal consequences for Husserl's project as a whole. Husserl acknowledges this critique to a certain extent and responds with a recasting of the transcendental subject in terms of the subject's 'concreteness', for which the 'transcendental person' functions as a key term. In section 2, I shall set Husserl's concept of the transcendental person in the context of his mature concept of constitution. This will prepare for a presentation of Heidegger's critique of Husserl's concept of the transcendental subject in section 3. In section 4, I shall try to elucidate
Husserl's counter-critique of Heidegger's objections and shall attempt to reconstruct Husserl's position, drawing from the scattered remarks that Husserl makes throughout his research manuscripts.
It is my intention to recount Husserl's arguments against Heidegger as convincingly as possible, not to judge the ultimate veracity of Husserl's position. In fact, a last assessment will, I
believe, have to come to the conclusion that Husserl, probably more than Heidegger, wore blinkers that simply did not allow him to see beyond the polemic context and terminology in which
Heidegger dressed his novel thought. Scholarship in this field made it clear that it was up to interpreters who did not belong to either Husserl's or Heidegger's camp to see the issues at stake more clearly. Their insights will be incorporated as much as possible in the course of this article.
The purpose of the article is to present Husserl's alleged arguments against Heidegger as he One can say, rather superficially, that Husserl's philosophy had subjectivity as its topic,
Heidegger's the question of Being. Nevertheless, one can make the case that Heidegger's emphasis, at least up to Being and Time, was on subjectivity as well. This is warranted by pointing out that the subject, qua Dasein, is the focus of the fundamental ontology in Division I of Being and Time, an analysis that is supposed to lead, ultimately, to the question of Being. The difference between them is that Heidegger conceives of this subjectivity radically differently from the way Husserl did; to the point that Heidegger considered 'subjectivity' or 'consciousness' inadequate terms altogether. Heidegger's critique of Husserl in Being and Time is first and foremost a critique of Husserl's conception of subjectivity, or more precisely, his framing of subjectivity along the lines of Cartesianism 9 and in terms of transcendental philosophy. 10 Yet, in this reading, Husserl merely stands at the end point of a development gone awry since Descartes. 11 Heidegger's counter-concept of Dasein, a 'being in the here and now' as the term for that being which we ourselves are (as essentially finite, caring beings), stands in stark contrast to Husserl's teleological concept of subjectivity as an endless field of research accessed by (potentially) endless reflection. In this sense, and not completely without legitimacy, Heidegger's approach has been portrayed as that of a 'hands on', pragmatically oriented philosophy of practical subjectivity and Husserl as an over-theoretical 'armchair philosopher' who seems to have no interest other than describing in endless detail the inkwell he sees standing before him on his desk. 12 Both readings are certainly exaggerated and to a certain extent unfair; yet they were the ways in which, falsely or not, the contrast between the two was often perceived -and in fact, by
Husserl himself. A closer look at both will reveal their inadequacy.
Indeed, to overlook the fact that Heidegger's characterization of what it means to be a Luft 5
human Dasein is a piece of 'theoretical' philosophy is fundamentally to misread Heidegger. Thus, the characterization of Husserl as the 'theoretician' and Heidegger as the 'practitioner' is an oversimplification and ultimately grossly misleading. They have in common a phenomenology of the subject, in Heidegger's emphasis on Dasein's practical behaviour and relation to itself, the others, and the world, and Husserl's focus on science and eidetic intuition in order to bring out general characteristics of transcendental subjectivity. However, this distinction still does not get to the core of the matter with regard to the question of subjectivity. Getting to the 'things themselves' 20 Rather, what he questions is the problematic methodological intention implied in proposing an 'unparticipating observer' in the course of the transcendental reduction.
The purpose of Husserl's unparticipating observer is to assume a standpoint, an 'attitude', that enables a description of the world and man after an epoche¯ from (a bracketing of) the 'natural attitude'. The natural attitude is Husserl's term for our unreflecting ('naïve') everyday living in the world. To do philosophy, to Husserl, implies a break with this unreflecting lifestyle. Moreover, this change of attitude from the natural to the philosophical standpoint also by necessity entails a transcendental turn from the naïvely living human ego, who takes the existence of the world for granted, to the ego that experiences the world. As such, the transcendental ego is the agent that 'constitutes' the world in intentional acts. Thus, although the transcendental turn is that which reconstructs causal relations between objects, the 'personalistic attitude' views human activity and interaction with the world in its genuine mode of existing (analysed under the heading of 'motivation'). 23 Opposed to the scientific 'view from without' (the third-person perspective) is the 'view from within', the first-person perspective, and a discipline doing justice to the experience of the human subject must be conceived of in this sense as a 'science of the first-person perspective' that avoids the fundamental category mistake of framing this science with the basic categories of the natural sciences. This will suffice for a summary of Husserl's view of the fundamentality of 'attitudes' and his insistence on taking a special standpoint -the personalistic attitude -in order to analyse subjectivity. 24 Distinguishing the first-and third-person perspectives and explicitly shifting to the first-person perspective are not yet sufficient to establish phenomenology as a rigorous science.
What makes phenomenology different from a psychological account? Phenomenology gives us access to the 'view from within' and thereby thematizes the multitude of ways in which we experience the world subjectively. This 'view from within', this experience of world, breaks down into many types of experience and attitudes. Phenomenology is certainly a 'rigorous science of the subjective' in analysing the different attitudes the subject takes towards the world.
Phenomenology's main insight is that the world is in a certain way given, and its task is to analyse and categorize these modes of givenness. Yet, merely shifting to the first-person perspective from the previously occupied third-person perspective is not enough to establish a science. The
Luft 11 question, then, is how to frame the first-person perspective adequately to make such a scientific account possible. Depending on this framing, a certain type of science will result. Since the personalistic attitude differs substantially from the naturalistic attitude, one can also expect that the epistemological character of a science of the personalistic attitude will be different from that of a science of the naturalistic attitude. Indeed, when Husserl insists that phenomenology -the science of the personalistic attitude -is a 'rigorous science', he is intent on carrying over this rigour from the natural sciences, but with a fundamentally different sense of rigour. What makes the natural sciences rigorous is that they are exact and produce repeatable results under
reproducible conditions and what they ascertain is laws of nature. However, their results pertain to factual entities in nature (plants, animals), and the laws they formulate are laws with respect to factually existing entities. The laws can only be formulated on the basis of things existing in nature.
Phenomenology's rigour, on the other hand, consists of the fact that its results are not just lawful but eidetic, i.e., true of any subject or consciousness and at all times, whether such a subject exists or not. Phenomenological laws are laws as well; they are not laws of ephemeral nature, but laws of 'spirit'. Phenomenology as eidetic science deals not with specifically human consciousness but with consciousness as such, regardless of whether it is human, animal, or divine. 25 Transcendental phenomenology is an eidetic science of transcendental subjectivity. Husserl, therefore, the psychologist's methodological stance is inconsistent for several reasons.
First, because it considers only the human psyche in its accidental disposition and not psychological states of affairs 'as such', it leads into psychologism. A psychologistic account amounts to a relativism that, because it is merely describing factual consciousness, is relative to the specific character of the accidental human subject, and not normative or eidetic. Should the psychological states of affairs or, e.g., the hard wiring of the human brain change, so could the structure of consciousness, which contradicts the essence of consciousness. Husserl's famous sentence 'The tree burns but the essence of the tree does not burn' applies to the essence of consciousness as well. This critique can be traced right back to the Prolegomena of the Logical Investigations of 1900.
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Following from this psychologistic mistake, psychology considers its position fundamental in order to describe the way the world is given to a subject, and in so doing disregards the fact that it is merely one way of describing among others -it wears epistemological 'blinkers'. It takes its point of view as absolute, whereas it is merely relative to its specific perspective. In Husserl's terminology from the Crisis, psychology is indifferent to the 'paradox of subjectivity', that the subject is an object in the world, and as such an object for disciplines of the third-person perspective such as psychology or biology, and at the same time a subject for the world, a subject which 'has' in the first-person perspective the world as its correlate. Therefore, psychology, precisely by taking the seeming fundamentality of its position for granted, declares its stance to be absolute and continues to maintain on the epistemological level a problematic duality between two different accounts that is not plausible phenomenologically. Indeed, psychology does not even see, let alone attempt to solve, the paradox of the two accounts and their basis in the two fundamental perspectives.
The phenomenological reduction and the transcendental attitude attained therein purportedly solve these problems. First, the attitude of the phenomenologist is neither naturalistic nor even personalistic in a simple and straightforward way, in the sense of naturalism. It is 'personalistic' in the purely formal sense of adhering to the first-person perspective; however, it goes beyond the perspective of the psychologist as it aims at an eidetic science of subjectivity as such. The phenomenological attitude is an attitude that commits to neither epistemological position naïvely and is hence neutral with regard to any absolute ('metaphysical') truth claim.
Rather, it is an 'absolute' stance in the sense of attempting a 'bird's-eye view' that is aware of the partialities of other attitudes which take themselves as absolute without being entitled to (because they are merely relative). 26 It is not a stance beyond the distinction between first-and third-person perspective; it is firmly a first-person perspective in a non-naïve ('critical') way, i.e., by being aware of its particularity. It is this 'metaphysical impartiality' that Husserl intends with the 'unparticipating observer'. 
27
Luft 13
This means that it does not consider only a certain stratum of consciousness, such as the soul (as opposed to, or 'above', or somehow appended to the body), but conscious life as such which is intentional in every respect when experiencing a world. Indeed, stipulating a priori formal distinctions such as mind and body without looking at the 'things themselves' is unphenomenological. The uninhibited and impartial look at our experience of world teaches us that the world is given in a manifold of ways and is given to different stands we take with regard to
it. Yet, in spite of this multiplicity, we experience this world as a unity or totality. Thus, despite its multi-layered experience, conscious life in general 'constitutes' the world for itself through intentional acts.
Husserl's paradigm of intentionality in the framework of his mature theory of transcendental constitution indicates that the world as the totality of what consciousness experiences is 'built up' from intentional acts. These acts can be conscious acts in the discrete sense of acts of thought (such as reflection or imagination), but also such 'physical' actions as walking around a three-dimensional object, touching it, dealing with it in certain contexts. The latter are not merely physical movements (i.e., without conscious 'ego-involvement'), but are ways in which consciousness, necessarily as embodied subjectivity, experiences world, even 'unconsciously'. Thus, the famous analysis of perception is an example of an eidetic account of how subjectivity on a very elementary level ('passivity') constitutes three-dimensional objects. If we look at 'experience of world', we do not at first find any kind of duality; we just have 'givennesses' for consciousness. 'Consciousness', however, is equally not some kind of abstract entity 'tacked on' to the body, but is my subjective awareness of myself and the world on any given level, no matter whether I am dreaming, feeling pain or 'physical' distress, or performing an intellectual activity such as doing phenomenology. Thus, viewed from the perspective of the phenomenologist, how we interact with other human beings emotionally and affectively, how we deal with them not only as physical bodies (Körper) but as 'besouled' lived-bodies (Leiber), is a form of constitution. Even purely 'intellectual' acts such as willing or desiring, when they are factually carried out, involve a 'physical' component when my willing results in an action or when a certain emotion changes my countenance. All ways in which conscious life in an embodied manner experiences the world fall in principle under the rubric of constitutive analysis as an eidetic account of consciousness. In other words, intellectual acts are just one type of acts. All experiences, each in their own way and specific manner, contribute to constituting the world for a subject, not a specifically human subject but a subject as such that is necessarily constituted as having a lived-body, living in a world as the totality of givenness for consciousness. and potentialities. It is not an entity different from that of the 'mundane person'; rather, it is the same human being viewed from the standpoint of the rigorous scientific first-person perspective of transcendental phenomenology. One quotation will suffice to outline this concept:
I, the human being in the world, living naturally only as this human being and finding myself in the personal attitude as this human person, am thusly not another ego which I find in the transcendental attitude.
[…] The transcendental ego as pole and substrate of its potential totality is, as it were, the transcendental person which is primally instituted [urgestiftet] through the phenomenological reduction. This ego will be framed henceforth in terms of the universality of the concrete transcendental and takes on for itself the all-embracing life that brings into play all potentialities and that can then Luft 15 actualize all possible modes of self-actualization. It will become apparent that natural personal existence and life is only a particular form of life, a life that remains identical in view of all potential changes, i.e., [it is] the actual and possible unity of life, centred through the identical ego-pole, which remains the same in all these potential changes. 30 The transcendental person is thus not an abstract or 'theoretical' moment of the human person, but the person viewed in its fullest 'concretion'. As such, it is just a different term from the more familiar concept of the monad that Husserl employs sporadically in 1910 31 and prominently in the 1920s (in Husserl's quite 'unterminological' manner of thinking). The 'monad' as a term for the transcendental ego entails (having recourse to Leibniz) that the ego, as a sphere of experience of world, implies the world within it. It also, moreover, reminds us of the Leibnizian distinction between factual and eidetic truths, the latter of which phenomenology strives to ascertain as truths of the subject as person in its concretion. 'Person' and 'monad' highlight different aspects of one and the same structure, and it is especially its appeal to 'concretion' that presumably leads
Husserl to shift terminology to the 'transcendental person'. To summarize: phenomenology is an eidetic science of transcendental subjectivity, i.e., it formulates eidetic laws of consciousness as such. In this sense, it is not bound to a specific type of consciousness, e.g., that of homo sapiens, 37 In Heidegger's reading, Husserl 'stumbles' over his own claim that that which constitutes the world is in itself not a worldly 'entity'. Husserl's problem is that he does not address the question of the being of the transcendental, a question that poses itself naturally if one considers the world-constituting agency not itself an entity of this world. Had Husserl done so, he would have seen that 'transcendental subjectivity' is merely an abstract stratum (defined in terms of 'possibility') of concrete subjectivity rather than an entity of its own type that can be described by a reflective turn to immanence. 38 Husserl conceivably shied away from this question because he believed that by virtue of the epoché he could be neutral with regard to any metaphysical or ontological claims. Yet, given the plausibility of Heidegger's critical points, his unarticulated conclusion (in a letter to his teacher, after all, from which these quotations are taken) is that the very idea of a transcendental ego is absurd -if, that is, one does not make the attempt to salvage this concept of the transcendental by somehow 'linking' it to the factical ego as Dasein. But already the dualism involved here is problematic. 'Transcendental ego' is a concept without any meaning of its own, but only 'in conjunction' with the concrete factical existing ego that exists, over against other entities with their own modes of being (as zuhanden artifacts and vorhanden things).
In other words, 'transcendental ego' is, for Heidegger, merely an abstract moment of the full concept of Dasein as factically existing in a factical world. It is dependent on the factical subject rather than the other way around -whereas for Husserl, the concrete subject is 'merely' a 'mundanized' transcendental ego. Heidegger to reject framing the question of the human being in the traditional discipline of anthropology (and, as we know, to reject other traditional disciplines, such as ethics).
Nevertheless, as Heidegger states in §10 of Being and Time ('The Delimitation of an Analytics of
Dasein against Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology'), he deems it a valid and necessary task to 'determine positively ontologically the mode of being of the person'. 40 It is in this context also that Husserl is mentioned alongside Scheler and Dilthey as failing to solve the problem of
Dasein's true being -although framing consciousness in terms of intentionality makes some headway in overcoming problematic traditional paradigms, e.g., the metaphysics of 'substance'. 
Husserl's Critique of Heidegger's 'Anthropologism' and Transcendental

Phenomenology as 'Philosophically Genuine Anthropology'
While the reader of Husserl's manuscripts dealing with Heidegger (to which we shall turn now) can see that Husserl acknowledges Heidegger's critique to a certain extent -at least the one mentioned in the previous section -Husserl in turn touches on a weak (or at least dark) spot in
Heidegger. Husserl might have been blind to many aspects of Heidegger's approach, but he saw very clearly that Heidegger's critique of the transcendental ego and the concomitant theory of transcendental constitution amount to a critique of Husserl's ideal of philosophy as 'rigorous science', i.e., as eidetic science of transcendental subjectivity. To Heidegger, the actual phenomenological analysis cannot be carried out by an unparticipating observer who stipulates eidetic truths, but must and can only be performed by factical Dasein itself in its individual concrete existing and its always already occurring self-interpretation. In other words, an 'eidetics' of the human subject understood primarily as transcendental subject is absurd, not because such an eidetics is impossible, but because such an eidetics of transcendental subjectivity cannot let us gain insight into the fundamental mode of subjectivity, factical existence. Such a project is, to
Heidegger, fundamentally flawed in wanting to do justice phenomenologically to human Dasein.
Rigorous, i.e., eidetic science is pointless with regard to an entity whose essence is to exist. This is one reason why Heidegger insists in §7 of Being and Time that the phenomenological method has to take its cue from the specific topic in question, rather than approaching an entity with a Husserl's point is that this theoretical stance necessarily entails the claim to rationality and scientificity. The opposition is not between the theoretical Husserl and the atheoretical Heidegger:
Husserl maintains that doing theory implies the very idea of rationality and scientificity. Husserl writes of Heidegger:
The philosopher doing anthropology believes that he can be a philosopher and in any case aims at truths, i.e., eidetic truths, at the least general human truths, whose nexus is Luft 22 a theoretical nexus that has its origin in a theoretical interest. This interest could be a mere passing one, it could be motivated practically, ethically, religiously, in the hope of bettering human beings by these insights, to spare them from intellectualistic or rationalistic aberrations etc. Yet, if one can identify science and rationalism, then every anthropology, no matter how it is characterized and no matter how it may thematize human 'existence', is equally rationalism. 43 As Husserl clearly saw -and as has been pointed out time and again by scholars 44 The radical question is now whether this natural ground of judgment (the ground that is presupposed by concrete life in all its activities and thus also theoretical life in which the sciences of this primal ground, the positive sciences, originate) is indeed a primal basis with regard to which one can no more inquire into the grounds of its validity, or whether it has, as we shall see, an origin which is, to be sure, deeply concealed but which can be revealed, a most complicated foundation systematically to be analysed, a constantly living but always concealed foundation, as absolute life and absolutely concrete being of that subjectivity which we ourselves are. Is it not precisely the method of 'classical' phenomenology, by opening up pure conscious life primarily in its most general forms and then progressing to the constitutive problems, that it also opened the way towards a reflection of the world which views any scientific world constitutively in its concrete relation to constituting subjectivity? Is not practical subjectivity also constituting, was it ever the intention of my phenomenology merely to reveal the nature of natural science constitutively? When one starts out, as I do, by explicating a natural concept of the world in a transcendental-aesthetical manner, then this signifies, as I still believe despite Heidegger, a necessary and a priori first system of tasks, that I have chosen the method of abstractive theoretical consideration only differently, but in a certain sense I have chosen it more primitively than Heidegger. 49 Thus, the concept of the transcendental person as that which constitutes the world in all forms of experience is intended to counter the critique that the transcendental ego is too abstract a concept to grasp the true personhood of the person. Husserl feels that Heidegger wrongly understands transcendental consciousness as a mere transcendental ego and not what it truly is, the transcendental person. Yet, framing the transcendental person as that which constitutes in all manners of intentionality also has consequences for Husserl's own conception of the unparticipating observer. This observer might be 'only' theoretically interested as well, but this theoretical work is equally constituting and as such carries out a 'continuing constitution' 50 of the world itself in terms of covering new ground in phenomenological analysis. In terms of constitution, there is no difference between theory and practice -since all acts constitute -and any such distinction, like that of mind and body, is dogmatic. Husserl's late realization that this observer constitutes as well must be conceived as a clear concession to Heidegger's critique. However, Husserl is not willing to give up the idea of a break with the natural attitude in order to cross the threshold into phenomenology.
These points by Husserl are meant as a counter-critique to Heidegger's assertion that factical existence is the absolute sphere whose transcendental origin cannot be questioned. The 'philosophically true anthropology' that Husserl proposes in the form of his transcendental phenomenology is an account of the transcendental which is, rightly understood, the absolute of philosophy. As absolute, it still has the general character of 'consciousness' as something that
Luft 26 needs theoretical reflection in order to describe it. For only this view yields the perspective upon the universe of subjectivity's concrete potentialities that can only be 'thought up' in reflective variation. This overarching 'absolute' essentially comprises the transcendental person as that which constitutes the world in all of its actualities and potentialities and the world as the necessary correlate of this constant process of constitution. 51 Only in this universal consideration can one claim to have reached true concreteness, in contrast to which the purely 'mundane', factical existence of Dasein is but an abstract, i.e., limited stratum. It is abstract because it absolutizes factical existence -in Husserl's terms, the natural attitude -without seeing that a different attitude or perspective on the world is also possible, no matter how one wants to characterize this account, analyses were not convincing enough given the popularity of Heidegger's existential philosophy.
Heidegger's critique merely presses Husserl to reframe his already operative concepts. The persistence with which Husserl presents this claim for concreteness shows that he is intent on salvaging his approach from the attack on his phenomenology launched so forcefully by his former favourite, and undoubtedly most talented, pupil. It is clear that this is an attack to be taken seriously, although Husserl seems to dismiss it rather lightly, which conceals the deeper and more problematic issues, the difficulty of which I have tried to indicate.
To Husserl, Heidegger merely stands at the peak of what he calls 'fashionable philosophy of existence' 54 which has abandoned the ideal of rigorous philosophical inquiry as well as the transcendental turn and indulges in factical, finite existence. But this criticism -although it sounds rather like the typical complaint of the older generation against the thoughtlessness of the newerstands for fundamental issues that Husserl has with Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology.
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The problem is precisely the question of the foundation that Heidegger seems to take too lightly in 55 So the conflict between the generations worked both ways.
In order to pose and answer the question of man, Husserl suggests, one needs an anthropology which has to proceed in a transcendental register and as an eidetic science, concretely as a constitutive, genetic analysis of the correlation of consciousness and world. Any claim to the fundamentality of Dasein blocks the way to subjectivity's concreteness which lies not in a given 'facticity', but in a 'transcendental concreteness', which in turn understands a given facticity, even that of doing philosophy, as a realized possibility of the universe of egoic, transcendental potentialities. 56 For Heidegger, in turn, Husserl took the right path in framing subjectivity in terms of intentionality, but stopped short at a premature stage -consciousnessand did not break through to the question of the being of consciousness. But Heidegger's step beyond meant breaking with the very paradigm of consciousness and its firm link to 'unparticipating theory', a move which Heidegger was very well aware of. Yet, Heidegger wanted not to disregard the question of the human being, but to free it from its confined concentration on the notion of consciousness. To be fair to Husserl one has to insist that he did articulate the human being's 'practical, valuing, willing', etc., activity, but he continued to articulate his philosophy in the language of mentalism. Heidegger wanted not to dismiss Husserl, but to bring him into his own. It is this move that Husserl could not comprehend.
Regarding the question of the person: in Husserl's eyes, Heidegger took his point of departure on much too high a level in trying to frame subjectivity's concreteness in terms of its factical fundamentality. The whole constitutive problematic after Husserl's genetic turn precedes Plato's theoretical dialectic, which turns the mind away from the everyday world of "shadows", to Descartes' preparation for philosophy by shutting himself up in a warm room where he is free from involvement and passion, to Hume's strange analytical discoveries in his study, which he forgets when he goes out to play billiards, philosophers have supposed that only by withdrawing from everyday practical concerns before describing things and people can they discover how things really are. The pragmatists questioned this view, and in this sense Heidegger can be viewed as radicalizing the insights already contained in the writings of such pragmatists as Nietzsche, Peirce, James, and Dewey' (p. 27. To be fair, one should mention that Husserl does envision a 'phenomenological psychology' that investigates intentional structures without performing the transcendental turn (see his 1925 lecture on 'Phenomenological Psychology', Hua IX) -but it is also fair to say that this is merely a construction in order to clarify the status of transcendental phenomenology. Such a discipline is indeed a hybrid, to say the least! 28. Of course, the concept of transcendental subjectivity in Husserl is neither a human's nor any other creature's but an a priori structure. Thus, the concept 'transcendental person' seems to me to indicate the transcendental 'correlate' of the concrete human person as we know it in our life-world. The transcendental person is an individual human subject conceived in her 'full concreteness'. It is thus a problem to equate -as Husserl seems to do in some of these passages -the transcendental ego with the transcendental person. I thank Sara Heinämaa for bringing this problem to my attention.
